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 completion was undesirable, and Park J. did not have "much
 enthusiasm" for his conclusions. He refused, nevertheless, to adopt
 this analysis to limit the detrimental impact of the decision on the
 security of transactions.
 The existing defences, such as change of position, will ordinarily
 prevent injustice to the payee. Sometimes, however, no defence will
 be available despite the passing of a long period of time. In the
 interests of commercial security the Law Commission has proposed
 a three-year limitation period following the discovery of a mistake,
 subject to a "long-stop" period of ten years from the accrual of the
 cause of action (Limitation of Actions (2001), Law Com No. 270,
 paras. 4.76-4.79). The Government has now accepted these
 recommendations but no legislation has emerged. The Deutsche
 Morgan Grenfell case illustrates that the problem is far from
 hypothetical or trivial, and legislation to deal with this difficulty
 should be brought forward at the earliest opportunity.
 Rupert Allen
 PROPRIETARY RELIEF WITHOUT RESCISSION
 The decision of the Court of Appeal in Halley v. The Law Society
 [2003] EWCA Civ 97 has the potential to muddy the waters of the
 law of rescission. It is a fundamental principle that a fraudulent
 misrepresentation renders a contract voidable at the instance of the
 representee (Bristol and West Building Society v. Mothew [1998]
 Ch. 1, 22). Modern authorities suggest that the representee does not
 have any proprietary interest in property transferred by him
 pursuant to the contract before rescission (see Bristol and West
 Building Society v. Mothew [1998] Ch. 1, 22-23; Twinsectra Ltd. v.
 Yardley [1999] Lloyd's Rep. Bank. 438, 461-462). It is only after
 rescission that the representee regains title in the property.
 Halley adds a twist to the analysis described above in that it
 suggests that the representee may retain an equitable interest in
 money transferred without the need for rescission, if the contract is
 an instrument of fraud. The Law Society intervened in the practice
 of a solicitor, Wilson-Smith, pursuant to the Solicitors Act 1974
 ("the Act") on the grounds of his suspected dishonesty. Owing to
 the intervention, the Law Society held US $114,000 in the
 solicitor's account pursuant to the Act. Schedule 1, para. 6(1) of
 the Act provided that the Society held the money "upon trust for
 the persons beneficially entitled to [it]". Halley applied to court and
 claimed to be the person entitled to the money. The money was
This content downloaded from 202.161.43.77 on Mon, 20 Nov 2017 09:56:34 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
Published in Cambridge Law Journal, 2004 February, Volume 85, Issue 2, Pages 173-184
http://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijinfo gt.2004.12.003d
Published in Cambridge Law Journal, 2004 March, Volume 63, Issue 1, Pages 30-35 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4509067?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents
 C.L.J. Case and Comment 31
 said to represent fees payable for Halley's services in respect of four
 transactions of a similar nature. The key players in these
 arrangements were Halley and Gibbins. They ran an elaborate
 scheme purportedly to raise money for interested members of the
 public. In return for their services, the applicants to the scheme
 (hereafter "the applicants") paid money into the solicitor's account
 for him to hold as an "escrow agent". The funds were to be
 released to Halley and Gibbins once their services were completed.
 Although the primary purpose of these arrangements was to raise
 funds for the applicants, the scheme was structured in such a way
 that it was impossible for them to access the money. In order to
 draw down on the funds, the applicants had to procure a bank
 guarantee for the principal sum plus interest. However, the evidence
 suggested that any bank would have insisted on the applicants
 providing cash security before giving such a guarantee. This would
 defeat the entire purpose of the scheme. It was found that the
 contract had been induced by an implied fraudulent
 misrepresentation by Halley and Gibbins to the applicants that it
 was possible to obtain the necessary bank instrument to access the
 funds.
 Carnwath L.J., who gave the leading judgment, dismissed the
 claim principally on the ground that Halley did not have an
 equitable interest in the money; the applicant retained the beneficial
 ownership because the court was entitled to disregard the apparent
 effect of the fraudulent contract since the contract was "no more
 than a vehicle for obtaining money ... by false pretences"
 (para. [47]). What is novel about this case is that Carnwath L.J.
 said rescission was unnecessary for the applicant to retain equitable
 title; there was nothing to rescind since the fraudster parted with
 nothing of value and incurred no obligations while the applicant
 was left with worthless documents. He said that where money was
 paid pursuant to a "contract" which was no more than "a
 dishonest device to obtain money", it was meaningless to insist on
 the requirement of rescission (para. [48]). Potter L.J.'s observation
 in Twinsectra that before rescission, the representee had no
 proprietary interest in the original property was distinguished.
 Twinsectra was said to be a case where the contract was induced by
 fraud, whereas the present contract was nothing more than an
 "instrument of fraud" (para. [47]). Similarly, Car and Universal
 Finance Co. Limited v. Caldwell [1965] 1 Q.B. 525, which suggested
 that a representee must rescind the contract before gaining a
 proprietary interest, was differentiated on the ground that the
 contract in that case had substance. The fraud was merely in the
 method of payment. In the present case the contract was simply an
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 "instrument of fraud, and nothing else" (para. [47]) and the court
 was entitled to disregard the contract. This point is significant
 because the implicit assumption is that the contract was void and
 not voidable. Therefore, Halley is potentially significant because it
 hints at a general principle that a representee retains an equitable
 interest in property transferred without the need for rescission
 where the "agreement" may be characterised as an instrument of
 fraud as opposed to a contract induced by a fraudulent
 misrepresentation. It is foreseeable that counsel for victims of
 fraudulent contracts in future will argue that their case should be
 characterised as the former since rescission is unnecessary for their
 clients to obtain an equitable interest in the original property.
 However, there are four reasons why Halley should be not be
 extrapolated to stand for any such proposition. First, the
 distinction introduced by Carnwath L.J. between a contract induced
 by a fraudulent misrepresentation and a contract which is an
 instrument of fraud may be difficult to make in practice. Second,
 Carnwath L.J.'s implicit reasoning that a contract that is an
 instrument of fraud is void is a novel point. Thus far, the courts
 have only been prepared to hold a contract void for mistake of
 identity (Cundy v. Lindsay (1873) 3 App. Cas. 459) or on the
 grounds of non est factum (Saunders v. Anglia Building Society
 [1971] A.C. 1004). In cases of fraudulent misrepresentation, the
 courts have always held that such a contract is voidable and not
 void. Third, Halley should have been decided on agency principles,
 especially with reference to the authorities on stakeholders.
 Unfortunately, this point was not pursued at trial and only raised
 very late on appeal. The Court of Appeal declined to hear
 arguments on this issue. In the present case, although the solicitor
 was described as an "escrow agent", he was a stakeholder for
 Halley and the account holder (see para. [xi] of the Appendix).
 This point is crucial because a stakeholder does not hold the
 money on trust (see Hastingwood Property v. Saunders Bearman
 Anselm [1991] Ch. 114; Gribbon v. Lutton [2001] EWCA Civ 1956,
 [2002] Q.B. 902; cf. Mummery L.J.'s analysis in Halley at
 paras. [91]—[97]). Thus, Halley's assertion of beneficial ownership in
 the money was misconceived. As Pennycuick V.C. observed in
 Potters (A Firm) v. Loppert [1973] Ch. 399, 406, "a contract
 deposit paid to a stakeholder is not paid to him as a trustee, but
 upon a contractual or quasi-contractual liability with the
 consequence that the stakeholder is not accountable for profit
 upon it". Halley's right to the money was purely contractual. If
 the contract had been valid and the payment conditions met, then
 Halley would have been entitled to payment. Otherwise, the
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 applicants had a restitutionary right to recover the money. As
 Carnwath L.J. found that the contract was an instrument of fraud,
 it followed that Halley had no right to be paid. Finally, Halley's
 claim could also have been defeated and in fact was rejected by
 Mummery L.J. on the grounds of illegality. Since Halley was party
 to a deliberate deceit committed against the applicant, the contract
 was unenforceable (see Brown Jenkinson & Co. Ltd. v. Percy
 Dalton (London) Ltd. [1957] 2 Q.B. 621). In conclusion, although
 prima facie Halley appears to be an important decision on
 rescission, it is submitted that the holding of this case should be
 confined to its peculiar facts.
 Tang Hang Wu
 CORPORATE OPPORTUNITIES: IF IN DOUBT, DISCLOSE (BUT HOW?)
 Recent proposals for codification of directors' duties have been
 driven by concerns about the complexity of the existing law and
 informed by debates about the strictness of the standards to which
 directors should be held. These issues are well-illustrated by the
 treatment of directors' "secret profits", once again brought into
 sharp relief by the Court of Appeal's recent decision in Bhullar v.
 Bhullar [2003] EWCA Civ 424, [2003] 2 B.C.L.C. 241.
 Bhullar Bros Ltd. ("the Company") was owned and managed by
 brothers Mohan and Sohan Bhullar and their families. Its business
 was a chain of supermarkets, although it also owned an investment
 property, seemingly as an afterthought. Relations between the
 brothers broke down in 1998, and they began negotiating a division
 of the business. At this time, the Company's board resolved not to
 acquire any further investment properties.
 Shortly afterwards, Inderjit, one of Sohan's sons and a
 director of the Company, took a brief holiday. During his time
 off he went bowling at an alley situated on the Company's
 investment property and operated by its tenant. Whilst there,
 Inderjit realised that a piece of adjacent land ("the Property")
 was for sale. He acted swiftly to acquire the Property for himself.
 Following advice from his solicitor, he did not disclose the matter
 to the Company.
 Mohan's family subsequently brought a petition under section
 459 of the Companies Act 1985 claiming that the Company's affairs
 were being conducted in a manner unfairly prejudicial to their
 interests, and amongst other things alleging that Inderjit's purchase
 had constituted a breach of fiduciary duty. At first instance, Judge
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